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The Effect of Voluntary versus Mandatory Adoption of Trading Policies on the Returns to 
Insider Trades 
 
1. Introduction 
A firm’s insider trading policy is an integral part of the overall firm governance system 
describing how a company is directed and managed such that objectives are met, risks are 
monitored and performance maximised. The role of a trading policy within the governance 
framework is to ensure and promote ethical and responsible decision making by insiders so that 
investor confidence is preserved and investor protection maintained. Furthermore, it provides 
transparency around policies surrounding insider activities, in particular restrictions on trading. If 
insider trading is viewed as an agency cost because private benefits can be extracted at the 
expense of other shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried 2003), an effective governance system can be 
expected to reduce this cost by active monitoring of insiders’ trading activities (Bettis, Coles and 
Lemmon 2000).  
 
Self-imposed trading policies work in conjunction with existing country level insider trading 
regulation which is enforced by market regulators. Lee, Lemmon, Li and Sequiera (2014) find 
that firm-imposed voluntary restrictions on insider trading activities are effective in reducing the 
exploitation of private benefits. In this study, we apply a micro approach to investigate the effect 
of investor protection (under the umbrella of corporate governance) on rent extraction via insider 
trading. Investor protection is proxied by a firm’s trading policy under two regimes of mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure. We examine how a firm-imposed trading policy affects the returns to 
insider trades, when the trades are conducted in periods demarcated as “blackout periods” or 
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“permitted periods” in both the voluntary and mandatory disclosure environments. In the 
accounting and finance literature and regulation, disclosure has been assumed to be a device 
which reduces information asymmetry, leading to less potential for opportunism. The regulation 
around the timely disclosure of insider trades is one example of this assumption. Huddart, 
Hughes and Levine (2001) also provide theoretical support by showing that prompt disclosure of 
insider trades reduces returns associated with them. 
 
Mandatory disclosure of trading policies is expected to result in a better information environment 
because Huddart et al. (2001) show that the disclosure accelerates price discovery and reduces 
returns to trades. Corporate information transparency has been found to be negatively related to 
the number of insider purchase and sale transactions and their profitability (Gu and Li, 2012). 
However, in their investigation of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans in the US, Henderson, Jagolinzer 
and Muller (2015) show that voluntary disclosure increases insider trading returns due to the 
legal cover provided by the disclosure. That is, the voluntary disclosure generated protection for 
opportunistic trading. The same could apply with the mandatory disclosure of trading policies 
where insiders trade opportunistically for higher returns and escape scrutiny because of a 
disclosed restrictive trading policy. We exploit this tension in the literature on mandatory 
disclosure of insider trading policies 
 
Prior studies, including Anand and Beny (2007), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Cremers 
and Nair (2005), show the effects of good corporate governance on firm value. Directly relevant 
to this study are the findings that strong corporate governance reduces returns from insider 
trading (Chang, Hillman and Watson 2005; Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog 2006; Jagolinzer, 
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Larcker and Taylor 2011; Ravina and Sapienza 2010). Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) 
use block monitoring to proxy for governance, Chang, Hillman and Watson (2005) use aspects of 
the board, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) employ Gompers et al.’s (2003) Governance Index and 
Jagolinzer, Larcker and Taylor (2011) apply the general counsel’s approval. In contrast, using 
shareholder protection, Fidrmuc, Korczak and Korczak (2013) find a positive correlation 
between country level shareholder protection and post insider trade abnormal returns, arguing 
that their results support the information content hypothesis. 
 
One contribution of our study to the existing literature is the investigation across two distinct 
years: the calendar year 2007 where disclosure of a trading policy was voluntary, though 
recommended and 2013 where it was mandatory.1 It is expected that the requirement to disclose 
a trading policy alters the trading habits of insiders and the resultant returns to their trades. For 
example, Brochet (2010) compares the information content of insider trades before and after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) where SOX required the reporting of trades within two 
business days and greater scrutiny of insider activities. Post SOX, insider purchase filings are 
accompanied by higher abnormal returns and trading volume while for insider sales, the returns 
are lower. Jagolinzer, Larcker and Taylor (2011) examine the role of the general counsel who 
was responsible for enforcing corporate governance within a firm. Trades requiring general 
counsel approval have lower returns and are less informative about future firm operations.  
                                                 
1 The Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASXCGC) released its Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations which included ten core principles and guidance on 
implementation in the form of best practice recommendations. Firms were required to disclose in the annual report 
the extent to which the best practice recommendations were observed and, if recommendations were not adhered to, 
the reasons for not doing so. Principle 3 of the Recommendations is relevant to trading policies and this study 
because it discusses the need for integrity among those who influence company strategy and financial performance. 
It also actively promotes ethical and responsible decision making. In particular, Recommendation 3.2 refers to the 
establishment of a policy concerning trading in company securities by directors, senior executives and employees 
and the disclosure of such a policy.  
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Our study also differs from prior work as we examine a range of items in the firm’s insider 
trading policy. Monitoring of trading activities is conducted via items within the policy such as 
timing restrictions on trades and notification prior to trading. In contrast to studies that have 
studied the influence of certain aspects of trading policy (see for example, Bettis, Coles and 
Lemmon 2000; Hillier and Marshall 2002; Jagolinzer, Larcker and Taylor 2011), we construct 
proxies that allows us to consider the combined effect of trading policy items on the information 
environment. We deliberate how these trading policy items influence the firm’s information 
environment by estimated trade returns.  
 
The composition of reported insider trades differs between countries due to the various 
definitions of insider: that is, parties who are required to report changes in their shareholding. In 
the U.S., corporate insiders are defined as company officers, directors and any beneficial owners 
of more than ten percent of a class of the company's equity securities (equivalent to substantial 
shareholders in Australia) while in Australia, the definition is restricted to company directors, 
being the parties who are required to disclose under s205G of the Corporations Act (2001). This 
important difference means that insider trades examined in Australia do not include those by 
large shareholders which may have different motivations for trading. Another important 
difference between the Australian and US institutional setting is the absence of the “short swing” 
rule (i.e., Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) where insiders are penalised 
for profits earned on trades made fewer than 180 days after prior trades. Because of this, the use 
of a more prescriptive insider trading policy may signal greater emphasis placed by the firm on 
corporate governance and monitoring. 
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Our results indicate that the number of items prescribed in firm trading policy has increased over 
the two periods examined. Only 7% of the firms in our 2013 sample did not have a restricted 
trading window, compared to 52% in 2007. On average, a firm’s trading policy covers four of 
the nine categories identified in 2007 and contains just over six categories in 2013. We also find 
in firms with greater analyst following and active trading by insiders, policies are more specific 
(i.e., have more categories), suggesting they were developed to instil investor confidence and/or 
to monitor trading activity.  
 
We find returns to insiders are higher when they trade in the restricted trading windows, inferring 
that insiders profit from information that they are privy to during those times. Within firms that 
impose blackout periods, the returns to insiders are lower when prior notification of trading is 
required. The effects of the prior notification requirement are evident and effective in 2013 
where the adoption of policies is mandatory.  
 
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the institutional and regulatory 
background while the hypotheses are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the sample 
used, the research method and provide the descriptive statistics. The results are presented and 
discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Background: Institutional and regulatory 
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In Australia, corporate insiders are required to report any changes to their shareholdings to the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) in a timely manner.2 At present, s205G of the 
Corporations Act requires directors to notify the securities exchange of a change in holdings 
within 14 days while ASX Listing Rule 3.19A requires notification within five business days. 
Corporate insiders can trade on information as long as such information is generally available to 
other market participants and a reasonable person would not expect the information to impact 
materially on the price or value of shares. In addition, in accordance with s.300 (11) of the 
Corporations Act, corporate insiders must disclose their end of financial year holdings in the 
Annual Report. 
 
The governance around firm trading policy is administered by the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council (ASXCGC). Within the ASXCGC’s Principles and Recommendations, it defines 
corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and managed” (p. 3). Of 
the ten core principles, Principle 3 discusses the need for integrity among those who influence 
company strategy and financial performance and it actively promotes ethical and responsible 
decision making. In particular, Recommendation 3.2 refers to the establishment of a policy 
concerning trading in company securities by directors, senior executives and employees 
(“designated officers”) and the disclosure of such a policy. This recommendation was deleted 
with the implementation of ASX Listing Rules 12.9 to 12.12, effective from 1st January 2011. 
Specifically, ASX Listing Rule 12.9 requires listed firms to have and disclose their trading policy 
in accordance with ASX Listing Rule 12.12. According to ASX Listing Rule 12.12, a trading 
                                                 
2  The term “insiders” here refers to company directors. 
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policy should, at a minimum, contain the following: closed period,3 trading restrictions that apply 
to key management personnel, any trading not covered by the trading policy, any exceptional 
circumstances when management may be allowed to trade during a restricted period with prior 
written clearance, and the procedures for obtaining such prior written clearance.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
3.1. Trading policy restrictions and insider trade returns 
The controversies around insider trading can be generally classified into rent extraction by 
insiders and improvement in the information environment via the information contained within 
trades. With respect to rent extraction, Ausubel (1990), Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and others 
maintain that insider trading transfers wealth from uninformed investors to informed insiders 
such that information efficiency and liquidity are adversely affected. On the other hand, Manne 
(1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983) assert its informational benefits where such trading 
accelerates the flow of private information into share prices. Therefore, the net effect of insider 
trading on the information environment would depend on the aggregate of the cost of rent 
extraction and the benefit of information content. Our study examines this effect in both 
voluntary and mandatory settings. If insider trading is a mechanism for rent extraction, then 
improved shareholder protection via more restrictive trading policies will result in lower returns 
following insider trades (Fidrmuc et al. (2013) refer to this effect as the monitoring hypothesis). 
On the other hand, if it represents a channel for private information to be incorporated into price, 
trading policies may not affect the returns to trades. This is because the policies have created an 
information environment where information is reflected in prices such that there are no excess 
                                                 
3 The closed period refers to the time periods when a firm’s key management personnel are prohibited from trading 
in the firm’s securities. 
10 
 
returns to trades. However, there could be another scenario where trading policies are overly 
restrictive, resulting in higher returns to trades, due to inefficient prices. 
 
Much of the work done on the effect of insider trading policies has been limited to timing 
restrictions on trades. For example, Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000) find 78 percent of firms in 
their sample had explicit blackout periods which resulted in reduced insider trading and narrower 
spread. As a result, trades outside the blackout period became more profitable than those within 
the prohibited periods. Jagolinzer et al. (2011) also report higher returns when insiders traded 
within the restricted windows. In contrast, while trading bans on London Stock Exchange firms 
affect the timing of trades, their performance remains unchanged (Hillier and Marshall, 2002). 
Lee et al. (2014) investigate voluntary restrictions on insider trading generally and found them 
effective in reducing insider exploitation of their private information. However, Lee et al. (2014) 
did not specifically examine whether these trades were conducted within restricted windows. 
Trading restrictions are expected to reduce insider returns from trading because Roulstone (2003) 
and Denis and Xu (2013) show that trading restrictions are accompanied by higher compensation 
and greater use of incentive compensation. One side effect of trading restrictions however is 
higher corporate risk taking (Yusnadi, 2014). 
 
Based on Bettis et al. (2000) and Jagolinzer et al. (2011), we predict that when insiders choose to 
trade within restricted windows, they do so opportunistically in order extract rents from their 
private information. Therefore, the returns are expected to be higher compared to trading during 
other times.  
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H1: Insiders earn higher returns from trades made in the restricted windows, compared to 
trades at other times. 
 
Jagolinzer et al. (2011) examine the impact of the general counsel who was responsible for 
shaping internal governance within the firm. They report that profits are lower when general 
council approval is required prior to trading. While Beny (2005) reports a negative relationship 
between the quality of insider trading law and returns, Bris (2005) shows that enforcement of 
insider trading laws results in greater incidences of insider trading and higher returns from such 
trading. Given that effective corporate governance mechanisms can reduce insiders’ ability to 
extract rents from other shareholders (Chang et al. 2005; Fidrmuc et al. 2006), we propose that 
the requirement to notify the firm prior to trading is likely to reduce the insiders’ profit when 
they trade.   
 
H2: Insiders in firms with the requirement to notify the firm prior to trading earn lower 
returns on trades in the restricted windows, compared with insiders in firms without 
requirements to notify prior to trading. 
 
4. Sample and method 
The regulatory requirements relating to the trading policies of Australian firms can be roughly 
segmented into two time periods. We consider the years 2002 to 2010 as part of the voluntary 
period. During this period, firms are required to provide a statement in their annual report 
disclosing the extent to which they have complied with the ASXCGC Recommendations and, for 
firms that have not adopted all items, to provide the reasons for not adopting those items. The 
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second period, 2011 onwards, represents the time when the adoption of an insider trading policy 
is mandatory.4 The ASX recommends a trading ban on insiders between the end of the firm’s 
financial year and the release of its annual earnings report and many firms impose this restriction 
on their insiders. These blackout windows are around periods where information asymmetry is 
higher and where insiders potentially are privy to price sensitive information. 
 
For each firm in the S&P/ASX300 index in 2007 and 2013 period, we source the trading policy 
from either the annual report or corporate website. The sample consists of 566 trading policy 
firm-years. Details about each firm’s trading policy were collected and based on the items 
disclosed in the trading policy, nine categories were identified.5 Items disclosed by firms were 
placed into one of these categories. Therefore, more than one item could fall under the same 
category. The collection of items from each firm’s trading policy identified 251 unique 
disclosure items. The list was reduced to 239 items, where items were disclosed by more than 
one firm in the sample. The appendix provides examples of items disclosed and their designated 
categories. 
 
The category disclosure score (ITP_Score) requires at least one item in a category to be disclosed 
to attain a value of 1. Otherwise, the score for that category is 0. The scores of each category 
were aggregated to arrive at a total score for each firm year. Therefore, the ITP_Score’s 
minimum and maximum are 0 and 9 respectively and equal weighting is given to each category. 
The nine categories are as follows: 
                                                 
4 The second edition of the policy was released in August 2007. 
5 With the exception of the ASXCGC’s recommendation on specification of discretion to trade in certain 
circumstances, the nine categories account for seven of the eight recommendations. 
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1) Definition of information on which insiders are not allowed to trade and 
reinforcement of regulation (def_info); 
2) Shares and financial products the policy refers to (app_itp); 
3) Restrictions on short term dealing (st_dealing); 
4) Awareness and monitoring of compliance with policy (comp_policy); 
5) Details of director shareholding requirements (dir_shh); 
6) Reporting of trading (report_trading); 
7) Prior notification/approval of trading (prior_notification); 
8) Windows in which directors cannot trade (dir_cannottrade); and 
9) Windows in which directors can trade (dir_cantrade).  
 
Data on director trading were collected for all firms in the sample. Trade data including date of 
trade, date of report of trade, name of director, number of shares traded, value of shares traded 
and reasons for the trade were obtained from Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium while firm 
characteristic data were sourced from Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium and I/B/E/S. Share 
price data was sourced from CRD. 
 
We examine if a relationship exists between the adoption and restrictiveness of the insider 
trading policy, and the characteristics of the firm using the following logistic regression:  
 
1
( 1) ,
1 
 
 X
Pr PriorNotification
e
 (1) 
where,  
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PriorNotification = Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the firm has a 
requirement that insiders notify the firm prior to trading and zero 
otherwise; 
Analysts = the natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm during 
the year;6 
MVE = the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation at financial year end; 
MB = the market to book ratio at financial year end; and 
Count_Purchases = the number of insider purchases made during the financial year. 
Count_Sales = the number of insider purchases made during the financial year. 
 
In a different specification of the above model, we replace the binary dependent variable with a 
continuous variable measuring the prescriptiveness of the insider trading policy in the firm. 
ITP_Score is the score based on the number of trading policy categories disclosed as described 
above. 
 
To identify trades to be included in our analysis, the following requirements were used to arrive 
at the final sample: the trade must be an on-market trade, the interest held by the director must be 
direct, the trade is not an initial or final change in shareholdings and the trades must not be due to 
exercise of stock options, bonus issues and rights issues. These requirements reduced the sample 
to 1,458 trades in 2007 and 2,710 trades in 2013.  
                                                 
6 We add one to the number of analysts for firms that have no analyst coverage. 
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We apply the standard event study method where the event is the reported date of a change in 
director interest. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with these trades were measured 
as market model adjusted returns over five, 10, and 20 days after the trade date. Therefore, CAR 
is estimated as: 
 
CARi,t = CRi,t - βi×CRMi,t  (3) 
 
where CARi,t+k  is the cumulative market adjusted return of share i on day t+k, CR i,t is the ratio of 
the price of share i on day t+k relative to its price at the start of the period on day t and CRMi,t is 
the analogous price relative for the market, proxied by the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index. 
Beta for the stock trade is estimated using the returns of the stock and market in the estimation 
period of (-110, -10) where day 0 is the trade date.  
 
We use Ordinary Least Squares regression with robust standard errors to analyse the relation 
between returns to insider trades and the individual firm’s trading policy, while controlling for 
trade and firm characteristics. The following equation was used to test the relationship7: 
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9 , , 10 ,
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Blacko , , ,   i t i t i tut PriorNotification e
 (4) 
 
                                                 
7 The return to sales was multiplied by -1 to allow a combination of the returns to purchases with the returns to sales. 
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Where: 
CAR = cumulative market-adjusted returns measured over five, 10, 20 day 
windows around the trade date;  
TxnValue = the number of shares traded multiplied by the last trade price on the trade 
date; 
RelVol = transaction volume divided by the number of shares outstanding at 
financial year end; 
Lag = the lag between the trade date and the date the trade is reported to the 
Exchange; 
Unclassified = a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trade was made in 
period where the firm has not specified if it is a restricted or permitted 
trading period and zero otherwise; and 
Blackout = a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trade was made in a 
period where the firm has specified that it is a restricted trading period and 
zero otherwise. 
 
The variables Unclassified and Blackout allow us to examine the returns to trades during the 
various trading windows. In addition, the variable PriorNotification permits us to inspect if the 
requirement to notify prior to trading mitigates the returns during the various trading windows. 
We control for the size of transaction (both TxnValue and RelVol), the lag between trade and 
report dates (LAG) which is indicative of the insider’s intention to conceal her information 
advantage, the growth prospects proxied by the market to book ratio (MB), and the size of the 
firm (MVE).   
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5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
There are 270 firms in the sample for 2007 and 296 firms for 2013. Of these, only 125 firms 
appear in both time period samples. The high drop off appears to be due to smaller firms not 
surviving until 2013. Table 1 Panel A shows the proportion of firms in our sample that includes 
the various categories of items in their trading policy over our sample period. Of the 566 firm-
years, there are 18 firm-years where a trading policy is not disclosed. These firm-year 
observations are from 2007 and as expected, all firms disclose a policy in 2013. Compared to the 
rate of 40% in 2000 and 2001 from Chang et al (2005), there has been an substantial increase in 
the number of firms with disclosed trading policies.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
When looking at the nine separate categories, we find 76% of the firms in 2007 have policies 
defining the information on which insiders are not allowed to trade (Def_info), with the number 
increasing to 94% in 2013. Approximately 54% of the firms in 2007 and 68% in 2013, have a 
requirement for insiders to notify the firm prior to trading (PriorNotification) in the firm’s shares 
and financial products. In both sample years, less than half of the firms stipulate the windows in 
which insiders are permitted to trade (Dir_cantrade). There is a substantial increase in the 
number of firms that refer to the blackout window in their policy (Dir_cannottrade), increasing 
from 48% in 2007 to 92% of the firms in 2013. Not surprisingly, ITP_Score based on the 
average number of categories the firm includes in its trading policy increased from 3.7 in 2007 to 
5.4 in 2013.  
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Table 1 Panel B shows that the firms in our two sample periods are similar when comparing the 
market value of equity (MVE), amount of total assets (TA) and the market to book ratio (MB). 
However, there is a significant increase in the analyst coverage (Analysts) from an average of 7.9 
in 2007 to 10.6 in 2013. Table 1 Panel C shows the size of insider transactions has also increased 
in terms of relative volume traded (RelVol). However, the transaction value (TxnValue) and the 
lag between the trade and report dates (Lag) have not changed across the two years.   
 
5.2. Relationship between insider trading policy, firm characteristics and frequency of insider 
trading 
Table 2 presents the OLS and logistic regression models for the two variables, and ITP_Score 
(Model 1) and PriorNotification (Model 2), on the characteristics of the firms. The models show 
that firms with higher analyst following (Analysts) are likely to have more restrictive policies and 
require insiders to notify the firm prior to trading. However, this effect is only observed in 2007 
(the voluntary period) and not in 2013 when a trading policy was mandatory. The number of 
purchases is positively associated with the number of items in the policy in both 2007 and 2013, 
but not the number of sales. Interestingly, the size of the firm does not affect the firm’s policy. 
 
During the voluntary period, analyst monitoring of firms and frequent trading by insiders are 
found to put pressure on firms to disclose more restrictive policies to mitigate the reduction in 
investor confidence and firm reputation loss when insider trading occurs in these firms (Ramsay 
and Shekhar, 2012). In comparison, when these firms are required to disclose a trading policy 
(which at a minimum should contain details on closed periods, trading restrictions, trading 
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outside the policy, exceptional cases when trading is allowed and written clearance for such 
trading), only firms with growth opportunities and frequent insider trading continue to invest in 
more restrictive policies. It is also not surprising that analyst following has no influence on the 
likelihood of prior notification, given that it is now a requirement under the mandatory policy. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In Table 3, we present the regressions of the frequency of insider purchases and sales on the 
insider trading policy score and firm characteristics. The conclusions from this specification of 
the relation are generally consistent with those drawn from Table 2. In the voluntary period, 
firms with higher ITP_Score have more insider purchases but not sales. This suggests that firms 
may set in place, in the voluntary period, more restrictive policies to ensure that insiders are not 
engaged in misconduct or are perceived to be doing so. However, the inclusions of requirements 
such as having the directors inform the firm prior to trading (PriorNotification) and stipulating 
windows where directors can trade (Dir_cantrade) or cannot trade (Dir_cannottrade) do not 
affect the number of insider purchases. The variable Dir_cannottrade has a negative relationship 
(significant at the 10% level) with the number of sales, indicating that directors are less likely to 
sell shares in the firm when there are restrictions with regard to when they cannot trade. 
 
Insiders are known to be contrarian traders; trading in anticipation of future price reversals 
(Seyhun, 1992) and trading contrary to the market’s overreaction to past performance (Rozeff 
and Zaman, 1998). The coefficients on MB indicate insiders’ contrarian behaviour and are 
consistent with trading against misvaluation, as reported in Piotroski and Roulstone (2005). That 
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is, insiders trades are negatively related to the market to book ratio (as shown in Table 3) and 
trade returns are positively related to the market to book ratio (shown in Table 5). Comparing 
purchases and sales in 2007 and 2013, the contrarian effect reduces in the mandatory period, as a 
consequence of more efficient prices in the improved information environment. We repeat the 
analysis (unreported) for a common sample of firms in 2007 and 2013 and find similar results.  
 
The relationship between the ITP_Score and the number of insider purchases are not evident in 
2013 (see Panel B Models 1 and 3). However, the inclusion of the item Dir_cannottrade has a 
positive and significant relationship with the number of insider sales and purchases (see Panel B 
Models 2 and 4). This suggests, when firms are required to disclose a trading policy, some items  
within the policy (i.e., PriorNotification and Dir_cantrade) are commonly adopted and hence are 
likely to be perceived as less effective as governance tools.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.3. The effect of trading restrictions on insider trading profits 
Table 4 shows the frequency of and returns to trading within and outside of the restricted 
(blackout) and permitted trading periods. The cumulative abnormal returns are estimated over 
five, 10 and 20 days after the trade date using the market model. Panel A shows the breakdown 
of the trades made in 2007. The average returns are small and range from -0.05% to 0.56% from 
five to 20 days after the trade. Of the 1,458 trades, there is only a small number of trades made 
during the blackout window (n = 5) (henceforth, blackout trades) and a substantially greater 
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number of trades made during the unclassified8 window (n = 1,091) (henceforth, unclassified 
trades). The returns to unclassified trades are consistently larger than the returns to the trades 
made during the permitted windows (henceforth, permitted trades), regardless of the windows 
used to estimate the returns. The difference is statistically significant when returns is estimated 
using the wider window of 20 days.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Panel B shows the returns to the trades made in 2013. About ten percent of the insider trades are 
not compliant with firm imposed trade timing restrictions.9 The magnitude of the returns to the 
unclassified trades is smaller than the returns to the blackout and permitted trades. Consistent 
with our expectations, the returns to the blackout trades are larger than the unclassified and 
permitted trades. The returns are significantly larger when returns are measured over a shorter 
horizon of between five and 10 days after the trade.  
 
In general, the mandatory disclosure policy has been effective because trade returns in two out of 
the three windows are lower in 2013 compared to 2007. However, a concern is the nine percent 
of trades in 2013 conducted in the blackout period and the 71% of trades in the unclassified 
windows. The latter suggest that there is still room for improvement in the details of the firm’s 
disclosed trading policy. The results in Panel A and B also suggest some of the unclassified 
                                                 
8 Unclassified trades are trades neither in the blackout nor permitted windows. 
9 However we are not aware if these insiders obtained special permission to trade in the restricted periods. 
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trades made in 2007 are likely to be made close to information events and would be labelled as 
blackout trades if we impose the windows known in 2013 on the earlier sample period.10 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression of cumulative abnormal returns on trading window 
indicator variables and the prior notification requirement indicator variable. We include the 
notification requirement indicator variable to determine whether there were differences in returns 
when firms had such an aspect of the policy in place. This allows us to test for an effect similar 
to Jagolinzer et al.’s (2012) general counsel permission to trade.  
 
Panels A and B show the regression model results for purchases and sales, respectively, made in 
2007. As there are a small number of blackout trades and these occur only in firms with policies 
that require insiders to notify before trading, the Blackout indicator could not be used for this 
model. The returns to unclassified trades are higher than the returns to permitted trades (t-stat. of 
1.57 and 2.16) when returns is measured using the five day window. However, the coefficient on 
the indicator variable Unclassified is not significant when returns are measured over the longer 
horizon. The coefficients on the interaction term Unclassified*PriorNotification in all models for 
purchases and sales are negative suggesting the prior notification requirement has a mitigating 
effect on returns. However, the coefficients are significant at the conventional levels for sales 
only when returns is measured using the five and 10 day windows.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                 
10 We examined the unclassified trades in 2007 by imposing the windows known in 2013. However, the results (not 
tabulated) do not support the findings for 2013. This is likely due to the relatively small number of firms that are in 
both year samples, and that these firms are typically larger in size and are associated with better corporate 
governance. 
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The regression results for 2013 are presented in Panels C and D, and the conclusions differ from 
those for 2007. Models 1, 2 and 3 show that returns to purchases made during blackout periods 
are significantly higher than the returns to permitted trades (t-stat. of 1.81, 2.95 and 2.66 
respectively), supporting Hypothesis H1. The coefficients on the interaction term 
Blackout*PriorNotification in all three models for both purchases and sales are negative though 
only statistically significant in models 2 and 3 (t-stat. of -1.74 and -3.06). Overall, hypothesis H2 
is supported with the prior notification requirement reducing insider trade returns. The findings 
are consistent with Jagolinzer et al. (2012) where trading profits in restricted trade windows are 
significantly lower when general counsel approval to trade is required.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We examine the relation between firm-imposed insider trading policy and the returns associated 
with insider trades. A firm’s insider trading policy explains and directs the behaviour of insiders 
when they trade in their own firm’s shares. Such policies are important because they provide 
confidence to investors that insiders are not abusing their position of privilege within the firm by 
extracting private benefits to the detriment of other shareholders. The trading policy is expected 
to affect the firm’s information environment and the behaviour of insiders when they trade due to 
greater transparency of the specific contents of the trading policy. This is specifically due to the 
requirement to obtain permission before trading can occur, timely reporting of trades after 
trading has occurred and restrictions on when trading can occur. 
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Our results show that the introduction of Best Practice Recommendations by the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council (voluntary disclosure period) has seen many firms choose to adopt and 
disclose their insider trading policies. Following the implementation of ASX Listing Rule 12.12 
where the requirement is for all firms to adopt a trading policy, this has led to increases in some 
of the details disclosed within the policies. During the voluntary period, firms with more analyst 
following provided more detailed policies, measured by the number of categories and items 
disclosed. We also find firms with more frequent trading by insiders with more detailed policies, 
perhaps to mitigate the likelihood and perception of insider misconduct.  
 
When the returns to trades conducted within and outside the restricted windows were compared, 
the returns in the former were generally higher. Not all firms impose these additional restrictions 
on the timing of insider trades and it appears that these restrictions were ineffective and non-
compliant insiders benefited more from their trades. However when we also included the prior 
notification requirement, the returns to these trades decreased, showing that the notification 
requirement was effective in reducing the extraction of private benefits.  
 
Our findings indicate that a firm’s insider trading policy is an important and effective governance 
mechanism to reduce the extraction of private benefits of control by affecting the firm’s 
information environment. Its development should be further encouraged, as seen from the 
mandatory requirement for listed firms to disclose a trading policy as of January 2011, resulting 
in a reduction in insider trade returns. Our findings provide some support for prescriptive rules 
on insider trading policy, over a principles-based approach. It appears that, within the mandatory 
period, firms are not simply ticking the boxes. Rather there is effective adoption and disclosure 
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of firm specific insider trading policies resulting in a change in insider trading behaviour and 
increased investor confidence. However, there is room for improvement because blackout period 
trades still exist. The effects of various characteristics of a trading policy on a firm’s information 
environment should be better understood together with its effect on insider trading behaviour. It 
is possible that the reaction to an insider’s trade depends not only on the size of the transactions 
but also its timing within the firm’s financial year.  
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Table 1  
Firm characteristics and insider trading policy items for S&P ASX300 firms  
  Proportion   Chi-sq 
  2007 2013       
Panel A: Insider trading policies 
     N 270 296 
   Def_info  0.759 0.936 
 
34.82 *** 
App_itp  0.926 0.804 
 
17.65 *** 
St_deal  0.170 0.628 
 
122.46 *** 
Comp_policy  0.148 0.193 
 
1.96 
 Dir_shh  0.044 0.115 
 
9.38 *** 
Report_trading  0.230 0.726 
 
139.42 *** 
Prior_notification  0.537 0.682 
 
12.58 *** 
Dir_cannottrade  0.481 0.922 
 
133.81 *** 
Dir_cantrade  0.381 0.409 
 
0.44 
  Panel B: Firm Characteristics Mean  t-test 
N 270 296 
   ITP_Score 3.678 5.416 
 
13.07 *** 
MVE 5,900 5,388 
 
-0.34 
 TA 12,366 16,085 
 
0.61 
 MB 3.662 3.008 
 
-0.72 
 Analysts 7.856 10.601 
 
6.75 *** 
Panel C: Insider trading variables 
N 1,458 2,710 
   TxnValue  1.198 1.172 
 
-0.05 
 RelVol 0.039 0.086 
 
2.98 *** 
Lag 4.831 5.099  0.57   
Note: The table shows the use of insider trading policy and the categories of items discussed in the 
policies for firms in the S&P ASX300 index for years 2007 and 2013. The table reports the proportion of 
firms with a policy that includes items in the following categories in their policy: definitions of 
information on which insiders are not allowed to trade and reinforcement of regulation (Def_info), shares 
and financial products the policy refers to (App_itp), Restrictions on short term dealing (St_dealing), 
awareness and monitoring of compliance with policy (Comp_policy), details of director shareholding 
requirements (Dir_shh), reporting of trading (Report_trading), prior notification/approval of trading 
(Prior_notification), windows in which directors cannot trade (Dir_cannottrade), and windows in which 
directors can trade (Dir_cantrade). The table also reports the mean number of categories (ITP_Score) 
discussed in the trading policies. MVE is the market capitalisation in $ millions; TA is total assets in $ 
millions; MB is the market to book ratio and Analysts is the number of analyst following. TxnValue is the 
transaction value measured as the number of shares traded multiplied by the trade price on the trade date 
in $ millions; RelVol is the transaction volume divided by the number of shares outstanding expressed as 
a percentage. Lag is the number of days between the trade date and the date the trade is reported to the 
Exchange 
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Table 2  
Regressions of insider trading policy on firm characteristics  
  
Model 1 OLS  
(ITP_ Score)   
Model 2 Probit  
(Prior_Notification) 
  Coeff t-stat   Coeff t-stat 
Panel A: 2007 
       Intercept 1.376 0.78 
  
0.170 0.14 
Analysts 0.567 2.84 ***  0.363 2.48 ** 
MVE 0.049 0.50 
  
-0.039 -0.61  
MB 0.012 0.68 
  
-0.003 -0.15  
Count_Purchases 0.032 2.11 ** 
 
0.011 1.01  
Count_Sales -0.106 -1.35   -0.026 -0.47  
        
Adjusted R2/ McFadden R2 0.090 
   
0.028 
 
 
N 270 
   
270 
 
 
Panel B: 2013 
       Intercept 5.057 4.54 *** 0.836 0.80 
 Analysts 0.005 0.03   -0.026 -0.17 
 MVE 0.012 0.19   -0.015 -0.25 
 MB 0.010 12.24 ***  0.004 0.52 
 Count_Purchases 0.014 2.25 **  0.010 1.13 
 Count_Sales -0.022 -0.64   -0.054 -1.54 
        
Adjusted R2/ McFadden R2 0.028 
   
0.011 
  N 296    296   
Note: Model 1 is an ordinary least squares model with the ITP_Score as the dependent variable. 
ITP_Score  is the number of categories discussed in the trading policy. Model 2 is a probit model where 
the dependent variable is the binary variable Prior_Notification which takes the value of one if the policy 
specifies that prior notification is to be given before the insider could trade and zero otherwise. Analysts is 
the number of analyst following. MVE is the market capitalisation in $ millions. MB is the market to book 
ratio and Count is the number of insider trades conducted during the year. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) levels, respectively. 
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Table 3  
Regressions of frequency of insider trades on insider trading policy and firm characteristics 
 Count_Purchases  Count_Sales 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 Coeff t-stat  Coeff t-stat  Coeff t-stat  Coeff t-stat 
Panel A: 2007                
Intercept -28.937 -4.17 ***  -28.307 -4.06 ***  -0.520 -0.45   -0.618 -0.55  
ITP_Score 0.543 2.35 **      -0.058 -1.19      
Prior_notification     0.841 0.78       0.122 0.60  
Dir_cannottrade     1.170 1.30       -0.282 -1.67 * 
Dir_cantrade     0.422 0.42       0.064 0.34  
MVE 1.425 3.89 ***  1.429 3.79 ***  0.036 0.53   0.037 0.54  
MB -0.086 -1.48   -0.096 -1.61   0.051 2.60 ***  0.052 2.67 *** 
Analysts 1.006 1.35   1.213 1.62   0.156 0.92   0.131 0.79  
                
Adjusted R2 0.147    0.154    0.029    0.051   
N 270    270    270    270   
                
Panel B: 2013                
Intercept -23.123 -2.03 **  -24.950 -2.11 **  -3.999 -1.87 *  -5.694 -2.49 ** 
ITP_Score 0.983 1.46       -0.038 -0.41      
Prior_notification     1.040 0.80       0.205 0.73  
Dir_cannottrade     4.018 2.07 **      0.925 2.53 ** 
Dir_cantrade     -0.046 -0.03       0.090 0.32  
MVE 1.221 2.76 ***  1.322 2.66 ***  0.258 2.25 **  0.275 2.42 ** 
MB -0.033 -2.09 **  -0.027 -1.72 *  0.003 1.14   0.002 0.68  
Analysts 0.036 0.03   0.294 0.23   0.135 0.69   0.172 0.87  
                
Adjusted R2 0.031    0.042    0.031    0.056   
N 296    296    296    296   
Note: The dependent variable, Count, is the number of insider trades during the year. ITP_Score is the number of categories discussed in 
the trading policy. Prior_Notification which takes the value of one if the policy specifies that prior notification is to be given before the 
insider could trade and zero otherwise. Dir_cannottrade (Dir_cantrade) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the policy 
specifies windows in which directors cannot (can) trade and zero otherwise. Analysts is the number of analyst following. MVE is the 
market capitalisation in $ millions. MB is the market to book ratio. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
(two-tail) levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Cumulative abnormal returns on insider trades in different windows 
  N CAR(0,+5) CAR(0,+10) CAR(0,+20) 
Panel A: 2007 Insider trading profits in different windows 
All 1,458 0.330 0.560 -0.050 
Blackout (BO) 5 -0.787 -1.726 -3.078 
Permitted (P) 362 0.118 0.295 -0.842 
Unclassified (U) 1,091 0.408 0.656 0.228 
t-test (BO versus P) -0.43 -1.20 -1.63 
t-test (BO versus U) -0.57 -1.42 -2.42* 
t-test (P versus U) -1.22 -1.22 -2.59*** 
Panel B: 2013 Insider trading profits in different windows 
All 2,710 0.240 0.270 0.620 
Blackout (BO) 249 1.436 1.353 1.134 
Permitted (P) 529 0.172 0.281 1.011 
Unclassified (U) 1,932 0.110 0.129 0.443 
t-test (BO versus P) 2.71*** 1.65 0.17 
t-test (BO versus U) 3.08*** 2.05** 1.04 
t-test (P versus U) 0.22 0.39 1.11 
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns, in percent, are the cumulative market adjusted returns where day 0 is 
the trade date. Abnormal returns are computed for each trade using the market model estimated over the 
period (-110,-10) where day 0 is the trade date. Blackout (Permitted) windows are specified by firms as 
periods where insiders are prohibited from trading (permitted to trade). Unclassified windows are periods 
that have not been specified by firms as periods where trading could or could not occur. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns on trading restrictions  
 Model 1 
CAR(0, +5)   
Model 2 
CAR (0, +10)   
Model 3 
CAR (0, +20) 
 Coeff t-stat   Coeff t-stat   Coeff t-stat  
            
Panel A: 2007 Purchase            
Intercept -5.632 -2.46 ***  -1.512 -0.52   -7.875 -1.96 ** 
Txn_Value (X 10-6) -0.024 -1.37   -0.041 -1.85   -0.045 -1.45  
Rel_Vol (%) 1.525 0.94   2.458 1.19   -0.660 -0.23  
Lag (X 10-3) -0.504 -0.06   5.652 0.53   8.354 0.57  
MVE 0.256 2.34 ***  -0.026 -0.19   -0.002 -0.01  
Analysts -0.363 -1.25   0.680 1.85 **  2.076 4.08 *** 
MB 0.067 1.58   0.109 2.03 *  0.417 5.62 *** 
Unclassified 0.787 1.57 **  0.861 1.35   2.409 2.74 *** 
Prior_Notification 1.185 2.20 ***  0.750 1.10   0.821 0.87  
Unclassified*Prior_Notification -0.741 -1.19   -0.678 -0.86   -0.905 -0.83  
            
Adjusted R2 0.007    0.003    0.039   
F-statistic 1.980    1.430    6.890   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.038    0.169    0.000   
N 1,316    1,316    1,316   
            
Panel B: 2007 Sales            
Intercept -22.106 -2.85 ***  -12.585 -1.09   -23.950 -1.44 * 
Txn_Value (X 10-6) -0.250 -3.30 **  -0.064 -0.57   -0.007 -0.05  
Rel_Vol (%) 7.013 3.34 **  2.121 0.68   0.809 0.18  
Lag (X 10-3) -9.673 -0.12   -97.710 -0.80   -3.092 -0.02  
MVE 0.898 2.32 ***  0.429 0.74   0.736 0.89  
Analysts -0.215 -0.27   1.074 0.90   2.493 1.45  
MB 0.051 0.97   -0.291 -3.70 ***  -0.700 -6.21 *** 
Unclassified 3.089 2.16 **  3.073 1.44   2.186 0.72  
Prior_Notification 2.599 1.77 *  2.440 1.12   5.597 1.79 * 
Unclassified*Prior_Notification -2.761 -1.57 *  -4.921 -1.88 *  -4.294 -1.14  
            
Adjusted R2 0.070    0.120    0.336   
F-statistic 2.180    3.140    8.940   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.027    0.002    0.000   
N 142    142    142   
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 Model 1 
CAR(0, +5)   
Model 2 
CAR (0, +10)   
Model 3 
CAR (0, +20) 
 Coeff t-stat   Coeff t-stat   Coeff t-stat  
Panel C: 2013 Purchases            
Intercept -0.998 -0.75   -1.157 -0.64   -0.028 -0.01  
Txn_Value (X 10-6) -0.084 -1.21   0.040 0.42   0.069 0.56  
Rel_Vol (%) 1.575 2.05 *  -0.262 -0.25   -0.217 -0.16  
Lag (X 10-3) -7.066 -0.75   -14.296 -1.10   -36.951 -2.20  
MVE 0.108 1.70 ***  0.083 0.95   0.151 1.33  
Analysts -0.474 -1.86   -0.333 -0.96   -1.211 -2.68 ** 
MB 0.007 0.68   0.009 0.60   0.016 0.84 ** 
Unclassified -0.214 -0.35   -0.318 -0.38   -0.711 -0.65  
Blackout 1.607 1.81 *  3.594 2.95 ***  4.201 2.66 *** 
Prior_Notification 0.361 0.54   0.825 0.91   1.548 1.31  
Unclassified*Prior_Notification -0.376 -0.50   -0.261 -0.25   -0.793 -0.59  
Blackout*Prior_Notification -0.702 -0.62   -3.111 -2.01 **  -5.599 -2.79 *** 
            
Adjusted R2 0.005    0.003    0.008   
F-statistic 2.060    1.700    2.620   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.020    0.068    0.003   
N 2,267    2,267    2,267   
            
Panel D: 2013 Sales            
Intercept 6.447 2.85 ***  9.373 2.88 **  15.654 2.78 ** 
Txn_Value (X 10-6) 0.002 0.18   0.004 0.29   0.009 0.36  
Rel_Vol (%) -0.142 -0.35   -0.592 -1.00   -0.947 -0.93  
Lag (X 10-3) 24.969 1.65   84.542 3.89 **  182.199 4.85 ** 
MVE -0.262 -2.48 ***  -0.328 -2.15 *  -0.504 -1.91  
Analysts -0.831 -1.37   -1.345 -1.54 *  -2.146 -1.42  
MB -0.008 -0.52 *  0.000 0.01   -0.034 -0.89 *** 
Unclassified 1.065 1.20   0.414 0.32   0.694 0.31  
Blackout 2.438 1.04   1.343 0.40   0.873 0.15  
Prior_Notification 2.300 2.29 **  3.131 2.16 **  3.670 1.47 * 
Unclassified*Prior_Notification -1.153 -0.93   -1.073 -0.60   -2.225 -0.72  
Blackout*Prior_Notification -3.224 -1.19   -6.599 -1.70 **  -9.309 -1.39 ** 
            
Adjusted R2 0.038    0.071    0.068   
F-statistic 2.580    4.050    3.950   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004    0.000    0.000   
N 443    443    443   
Note: Txn_Value is the transaction value measured as the number of shares traded multiplied by the trade 
price; Rel_Vol is the transaction volume divided by the total number of shares outstanding as at the end of 
the financial year; Lag is the lag between the trade date and the date the trade is reported to the Exchange; 
MVE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation at the beginning of the year; Analysts is the 
number of analyst following; MB is the market to book ratio at the beginning of the year; Blackout 
(Permitted) windows are specified by firms as periods where insiders are prohibited from trading 
(permitted to trade) and zero otherwise. Unclassified windows are periods that have not be specified by 
firms as periods where trading could or could not occur. Prior_Notification which takes the value of one if 
the policy specifies that prior notification is to be given before the insider could trade and zero otherwise.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) levels, respectively. 
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Appendix: Examples of items in the insider trading policy by category 
 
 
Policy category 
 
Examples of items within the category 
Def_info • Cannot trade on price sensitive information 
• Cannot trade on price sensitive about other companies 
 
App_itp • Restrictions apply to trading in company shares 
• Restrictions apply to trading in financial products created by third 
parties 
 
St_deal • Directors must not undertake short term dealing (<1 year) 
• Directors must not undertake short term dealing in related 
securities (<1 year)  
 
Comp_policy • Prior to trading, directors must review pre-dealing checklist/ 
declaration signed prior 
• Directors must declare annual compliance with policy 
• Penalties for breach in place 
 
Dir_shh • Share trading policy stipulates that managing director can only 
deal in company shares 
• Share trading policy stipulates directors must hold minimum  
Shares  
• Non-executive directors must invest 25% of director fees per  
Year in company 
 
Report_trading • Directors must give details of trade to company secretary/ 
company 
• Directors must give details of trade to chair 
 
Prior_notification • Directors must give prior notice of trade to company 
• Directors must give prior notice of trade to company secretary  
• Director notices reported to audit committee 
 
Dir_cannottrade Directors cannot trade: 
• 76-90 days prior 
• 61-75 days prior 
• 31-45 days prior 
• 0-24 hours after 
• 25-48 hours after 
 
Dir_cantrade Directors can trade: 
• 0-24 hours after  
• 25-48 hours after 
• 22-30 days after 
• 31-45 days after 
 
 
